TACKLING THE ULFA MONSTER

TACKLING THE ULFA MONSTER

By M Rama Rao

New Delhi, Jan 23: Clearly there are two dimensions to the situation in Assam.
One relates to the easy manner in which urban clusters of "Hindi-
speaking" peoples can be targeted; and the other relates to the back
channels and jungle hideouts that are both lines of escape and lines
of sustenance for the terrorist organisation from bases and
sanctuaries mostly in Bangladesh, where ULFA has emerged as a major
financier of political parties and in fact opened war chest of Rs. 30
crores to fund selected candidates entering the parliament election
due in another six months.

Government's immediate objective is to put ULFA on the run and
deprive it of targets in clusters of Hindi speaking workers, who are
the easy prey. That is why the additional deployment of security
forces -- Army, Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police force
and provincial armed constabulary—which are now being brought under a
unified command under the Chief Minister's supervision needs to
concentrate, in the first instance.

So far as political message is concerned the ULFA knows that its
claims to "sovereignty" are in no way enhanced by killing migrant
workers because they are, very literally, peripheral to the whole
issue. Yet killing "Hindi-speaking migrants" are the only viable
targets it can find in the Assam of its dreams. Targeting the migrant
Muslims from Bangladesh is out of question because that would hurt
their interests in Bangladesh.

ULFA has been issuing quit notices to "Hindi-speaking Biharis" by the
dozen. It has put Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi on notice that it will
not allow the national games to be staged as planned. It is doubtful
whether ULFA will succeed in its new mission. Even if it does, it
will not matter an iota in the supposed ULFA objective of securing
sovereignty from India. Another fall out of the campaign of
indiscriminate destruction in crowded localities and market places is
organisations like the Peoples Consultative Group become muted in
their support to ULFA.

Well, to put differently, the security forces have a very favourable
groundswell of silent support. The more the ULFA resorts to violence
to stamp its diktat on the local population the more it isolates
itself. The cordon-and search operations of the security forces
therefore must concentrate on capture and political neutralisation.
Every care must be taken to minimise hardships to the people.
Otherwise, the psychological edge will be lost.

That Prime Minister is willing to learn from experience is clear from
his visit to the violence hit areas in Assam. This time both the
centre and the state should work together, and avoid the temptation
to announce another ceasefire after a few days of 'peace'. There is
no substitute to improved patrolling, bomb-detection and confidence
building measures. Intelligence gathering will become effective if
central agencies give up the colonial hangovers of looking upon
provincial apparatus with suspicion and realise that whatever be the
technological tools at their command, they remain dependent on the
local Thana for basic inputs and as such the morale of the local
police should not be undermined in any manner.

The current slow pace of operations is largely due to a paucity of
actionable intelligence about the presence of the ULFA cadres in any
given locality. As patrolling improves and the confidence of the
local population in the security forces grows the availability of
intelligence will improve, making for a larger number of arrests.
Paramount to the security operations is the requirement that no
atrocities should occur because that becomes grist to ULFA's
political mill. As has been often stated counter-insurgency is a
manpower-intensive operation and more personnel on the ground (as the
Americans are learning in Iraq) the better the maintenance of law and
order and intelligence gathering.

In fact, more intelligence collected from within the urban milieu
will help to control insurgency on the periphery—the rural areas and
the forested areas. There the strategy will, perforce, be one of wait-
and-watch. The absence of an overt and commanding political presence
in any given urban setting will redound on the ULFA's ability to
project its political diktat and that, for the security forces, is
half the battle won.

To what extent the Pranab Mukherjee visit to Myanmar has helped to
soften the Yangon Junta approach to dealing with ULFA is unclear.
Indications are that there is still some hesitancy on the part of
Myanmar government on acceding to Indian requests for a coordinated
operation on both sides of the border against ULFA. So, the best
course for India is not asking for deployment of Myanmar security
forces (and thereby opening itself to demands for equipment,
ammunition and means of communication) but seek permission for hot
pursuit. How to go about the task of hot pursuit is a matter of
operational detail. There are in all 12 sanctuaries of ULFA.

For a surgical action and best results, Special Forces can be
paradropped for cleaning up these camps. Firstly such a move carries
the element of surprise. Secondly, it gives the choice of time.
Thirdly, there will be no need to depend on Myanmar, whose forces are
mostly engaged in its own counter-insurgency operations along the
Thailand border. Joint operation against ULFA will mean shifting some
of them to the border with India, which, given its present
disposition, Yangon is not keen to do.

An advantage of the approach is that India will be able to assess
whether recent Myanmar reluctance is not dictated by China's
geopolitics. China has of late become active in Myanmar. Beijing will
be content to see Indian security forces tied down in counter-
insurgency operations all along its eastern flank. So, the point is
it is imperative for India to demonstrate a greater degree of self-
reliance in its counter-insurgency operations.

Admittedly, India will remain at sea in dealing with ULFA hideouts in
Bangladesh. The Asom ultras enjoy the patronage of Pakistan Army's
Inter-Services Intelligence, which is very active in the area, and
the Islamist fundamentalists. ULFA leaders enjoy goodwill of the two
major parties – the India friendly Awami League headed by Sheikh
Hasina and the India baiting BNP of Begum Khaleda Zia. This is the
reason why top leaders of ULFA are able to build a Rs. 500 crore
industrial empire in Dhaka and its surroundings and also are able to
dodge the Interpol warrants for deportation whether it was AL or BNP
in power.

Super cop, K P S Gill, says ULFA's ties with Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and Directorate General of Field
Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh date back to 1989 when these
contacts were on a modest scale. His assessment is that ULFA has
several income generating projects in Bangladesh. These range from
three hotels and a soft drink manufacturing unit to a private clinic,
and two motor driving schools. ULFA is believed to manage even media
consultancies in Dhaka. Some children of top ULFA leaders are
reportedly studying in the USA and Canada under ISI protection.

Paresh Barua, ULFA's commander –in-chief, sits on a huge business
empire that spawns a tannery, a chain of departmental stores, garment
factories, travel agencies, shrimp trawlers and transport and
investment companies besides a star hotel. His personal worth is
estimated at Rs. 30 crore. . Barua, who uses several aliases, like
for instance, Kamruj Zaman Khan, Nur-uz-Zaman or Zaman Bhai, is
staying in a posh Dhaka locality with his wife, Bobby, better known
as Sufia Begum, and his two children, Tahshim Khan and Akash Khan.

Reflecting its new strength, ULFA leadership is said to be
paying 'protection money' to DGFI functionaries particularly at the
low and middle level. Some elements in ISI also appear to be milking
them, reflecting their 'complete and firm' grip over the Assam ultras.

It is not clear as to at what stage of their stay in Bangladesh, ULFA
leaders became active on the local political scene. But it is clearly
established by now that they have established a network of political
patronage that cuts across party barriers. They are using the network
as some sort of insurance cover. Barua's funds are reportedly managed
by a top functionary of Jatiya Party headed by Gen Ershad, a former
president, who is now aligned with Awami League. This functionary,
like Ershad himself, is an aspirant for a place in the new parliament.

Understandably, therefore, ULFA has more at stake in the outcome of
the Bangladesh election than the two Begums at war with each other.
ULFA has earmarked some Rs. 30 crore as election fund. How many
candidates are directly funded by ULFA and how many are on its rolls
for other help will become clear once a fresh countdown for elections
begins. ULFA identified some fifteen seniors across the entire
political spectrum before the elections initially slated for Jan 22
were cancelled under Awami League's boycott threat. These fifteen
senior politicians are also beneficiaries of ISI largesse and this is
yet another instance of convergence of interests between ISI and
ULFA.

It should be clear to any one by now why United Liberation Front of
Asom is targeting the 'Hindi speaking Bihari migrant', and not the
Bangladeshi Muslims, who are the 'real infiltrators' into Assam.

--
Mr M Rama Rao is senior journalist based in New Delhi and is member
of the South Asia Contact Group.